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Abstract 
 
 The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBP) is a Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) program implemented in 2012 to reward acute-care hospitals with 
incentive payments for the quality of care provided to Medicare patients in inpatient settings. 
Under this policy, payment adjustments are made based on a variety of factors including clinical 
quality, patient experience, and cost reductions. This paper uses state-level variation in the 
implementation of HVBP to ascertain whether the policy led to improvements in Healthy Days 
(a CDC-designed composite measure of individuals’ self-reported number of physically and 
mentally “healthy” days per month), health disparities, and community benefit spending patterns 
using a difference-in-differences model. Notably, this paper adds to economic literature on health 
equity by utilizing and comparing three measures of health disparity, including a novel measure 
of health inequity that includes a social justice component in the U.S. context. Results show that 
the HVBP led to meaningful improvements in Healthy Days, with differential effects based on 
income and race. It also significantly reduced health disparities and significantly increased 
certain types of community benefit spending, showing that hospitals can and should be invested 
in addressing community health. Policymakers should continue to use value-based policies to 
implement incentives to achieve health equity, but must be more thoughtful and intentional with 
these efforts by grappling with racial, political, sociological, and economic structures that 
contribute to inequity. 
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Introduction 
In response to high and rising healthcare costs in the United States (Levit et al., 2004), 
healthcare reforms over the past two decades have attempted to reduce healthcare costs while 
maintaining, if not improving, quality of care. Compared to other high-income countries, the 
United States has the highest uninsured rate and also spends more per capita on healthcare 
(Papanicolas et al., 2018). This spending does not translate to better outcomes; compared to other 
OECD nations, the U.S. spends nearly twice as much on healthcare as a share of the economy as 
the average OECD country but has the lowest life expectancy, the highest suicide rate, the 
highest chronic disease burden, and one of the highest rates of hospitalizations from preventable 
causes (Tikkanen & Abrams, 2020). Income-based health disparities are much more pronounced 
in the United States than in other high-income countries (Choi et al., 2020). A large body of 
literature suggests that health disparities, including disparities by race, gender, and 
socioeconomic status, to name a few, are not only morally unjust but have a significant financial 
cost (Waidmann, 2009; LaVeist et al., 2011; Turner, 2016; Thorpe et al., 2013). By some 
estimates, eliminating health disparities for racial/ethnic minorities would have reduced direct 
medical care expenditures by about $230 billion and indirect costs associated with illness and 
premature deaths by more than $1 trillion for the years 2003 – 2006 (in 2008 inflation-adjusted 
dollars) (LaVeist et al., 2011). Others estimate that disparities in health in the U.S. today 
represent $93 billion in excess medical care costs and $42 billion in untapped productivity, for a 
total potential economic gain of $135 billion per year (Turner, 2016). Therefore, a clear 
monetary incentive to reduce inequity in health outcomes across socioeconomic and 
demographic lines exists from both social justice and economic perspectives. 
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While structural causes of health inequity such as disparities in food access, health 
insurance coverage, and racial disparities in wealth are well-documented, relatively little is 
known about the impact that hospitals can have in furthering equity. Value-based payment 
includes models that attach financial incentives/disincentives with provider performance in a 
variety of domains including clinical quality, readmission rates, patient experience, and cost-
effectiveness of care. One such value-based program currently in place in the United States is the 
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program 
(HVBP), which reduces all Medicare payments to acute-care hospital by 2% and redistributes the 
saved funds to hospitals based on their performance and year-to-year improvement in four 
domains: safety, clinical care, efficiency and cost reduction, and patient and caregiver-centered 
experience (NEJM Catalyst, 2018). How hospital-level incentives introduced by HVBP in 2012 
affect health outcomes, health inequity, and community health-related spending by hospitals 
(formally known as community benefit spending), is explored further in this paper.  
Theoretically, hospitals that seek to improve their patient engagement scores and reduce 
costs may choose to invest in community health spending to reach underserved populations who 
typically have limited access to low-cost care such as primary care and are over-utilizers of high-
cost care such as emergency departments, both due to greater accessibility and poorer health 
(Kangovi et al., 2013). Examples of community benefit spending include community building 
activities (e.g. establishing a hospital-based food bank or housing voucher program), providing 
more free care or accepting more Medicaid patients even though Medicaid typically has lower 
reimbursement rates than private insurers, or conducting research on the health needs of the local 
community. Unfortunately, the literature regarding community benefit spending is comparatively 
sparse. One longitudinal study found that in spite of the ACA’s requirement for hospitals to 
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conduct and report Community Health Needs Assessments to guide their benefit spending, 
community benefit spending increased only marginally after the passage of the ACA (Young et 
al., 2018). Others found that hospitals located in states where Medicaid expansion took effect 
decreased spending in uncompensated care but that these savings did not translate into additional 
direct community benefit spending (Kanter et al., 2020). The nature of the relationship between 
the average amount spent on providing direct community benefits by hospitals and health equity 
rates in the hospital’s service area is unknown; whether hospitals with historically high 
community benefit spending have indeed improved health equity in the areas surrounding them 
leading to a positive correlation between the two, or whether hospitals in areas of low equity are 
spending more on community benefits to ameliorate the disparities, leading to a negative 
correlation, is unclear but necessary to avoid unintentional penalties. Thus, while promoting 
health equity is not an explicitly stated goal of the HVBP program, the value-based incentive 
structure which prioritizes the patient care experience, clinical quality, and cost-reduction may 
reduce the health gap between the most and least privileged patients. The central research 
question then, is to understand whether healthcare payment reforms that reward quality of care 
rather than quantity of care (as the shift away from fee-for-service and toward value-based 
payment continues to do) effectively lead to changes in hospital behaviors that ultimately 
improve average health and reduce gaps in health outcomes for local residents.  
Using state-level variation in the implementation of HVBP, this paper analyzes the role 
of value-based policies and their potential to improve aggregate health outcomes, reduce health 
disparities, and promote community health initiatives at hospitals nationwide. A difference-in-
differences (DID) analysis is used to assess hospitals’ potential to improve equity through two 
channels: improved patient communication and community investments. Data sources include 
 Kadiyala 9 
the CDC’s BRFSS from the 2010 to 2016 periods to quantify health outcomes using Healthy 
Days and health disparities using three different measures, as well as data from the Hospital 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) to evaluate patient 
experience ratings, and data compiled by RTI International to quantify hospitals’ community 
benefit spending. Supplementary multiple linear regression models are utilized to identify the 
associations between hospital quality (using HCAHPS data on patient communication) and 
benefit spending, and health outcomes and equity. In other words, this paper evaluates whether 
value-based policies that do not explicitly aim to reduce inequity maintain the status-quo, 
exacerbate inequities, or reduce them by motivating hospital spending patterns toward 
community-oriented efforts. 
Much of the existing health economics research has studied the effects of various policies 
on access to care, primarily through changes in insurance coverage and healthcare utilization, but 
little attention has been given to how healthcare policies have impacted health equity. The 
concept of “health equity” is not new, but it has been difficult for researchers to standardize for 
evaluation purposes, contributing to the issue. In a widely cited paper, Whitehead (1992) defined 
health inequities as “differences in health that are unnecessary, avoidable, unfair and unjust.” 
Braveman and Gruskin (2003) built on this definition, supporting “operationalization of the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health as indicated by the health status of the most socially 
advantaged group” and specifically noted the importance of comparing both health outcomes and 
the social drivers of health between more and less advantaged social groups. In doing so, 
Braveman and Gruskin contextualize inequitable patterns in health outcomes between various 
demographic groups by grounding the study of health in the study of the socioeconomic and 
political factors that lead to these disparities. Previous literature has used various indicators and 
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composite measures to quantify structural and community drivers of health outcomes, including 
community trauma, Gini Index, and academic achievement (Davis, 2015). More recently, 
UCLA’s Center for Health Advancement developed a “Health Equity Metric” (HEM) that is 
distinct from other traditionally used measures, and builds on Braveman and Gruskin’s 
sociologically-grounded framework. While other measures of inequity usually compare an 
individual’s health to the population average, HEM compares an individual’s health with the 
average health of the most socially privileged group. Using data regarding respondents’ average 
number of healthy days per month, researchers have calculated “the distastefulness associated 
with one's health falling short of optimal achievable health, instrumentalized as the median 
health of the most socially privileged category, that of upper-income white men.” Because of its 
novelty, few studies have been able to study health equity through this lens, but existing 
literature has shown that the Health Equity Metric has actually declined over time, underscoring 
a lack of progress in this domain in spite of major changes in health policy at the federal level 
(Zimmerman and Anderson, 2019). Thus, the literature in this space is graduating from the 
identification of health disparities toward the measurement of health inequities, and should 
continue to prioritize the evaluation of various policies and programs that promote health equity. 
This thesis evaluates how HVBP led to changes in health inequities using the HEM along with 
two other measures to see whether different measures of disparities tell different stories about 
health inequity in America.  
The HVBP’s novel addition of patient experience-based financial rewards for hospitals 
poses an interesting question as to whether positive patient experience actually translate to better 
health outcomes. The policy uses the nationally administered Hospital Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey to determine payment rates, providing 
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better reimbursement rates to hospitals that score better for patient communication and overall 
patient care ratings. Beginning in FY 2018, this “Person and Community Engagement” portion 
accounted for 25% of the overall score, and was used to determine payments.1 The theoretical 
model developed by Street et al. (2009) links clear and culturally aware doctor-patient 
communication to better patient health outcomes due to better information exchange, and 
through fostering trust and feelings of patients’ self-determination.  
Previous research has confirmed communication biases towards patients of color, so 
policies that encourage better patient communication may actually benefit patients of color more 
than white patients, thus contributing to lessened health disparities. For example, Johnson et al. 
(2004) found that physicians were more verbally dominant and less engaged in patient-centered 
communication with Black patients when compared to white patients, contributing to racial 
disparities in health care quality. This difference is consistent with other findings that Black 
Americans tend to receive care at hospitals with lower quality scores compared to white 
Americans (Figueroa et al., 2016). Studies have also found that lower hospital quality scores tend 
to cluster in densely population and demographically heterogeneous areas (McFarland et al., 
2015). While some argue that tying hospital quality to Medicare reimbursement through HVBP 
would incentivize hospitals to proactively and intentionally improve the patient experience 
through various efforts, others fear that doing so would unintentionally penalize hospitals serving 
more diverse and at-risk patient populations. While it is not the focus of this paper to 
characterize the distribution of patient experience scores across hospitals, some analyses will 
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experience, hospital-level community benefit spending, and patient outcomes in terms of healthy 
days and health inequities.  
Little quantitative literature currently exists to understand how measures taken at the 
hospital level can broadly affect health equity. Existing literature has largely focused on 
intervention evaluations, and has extensively documented how particular programs have affected 
disparities in hospital utilization and specific clinical outcomes. For example, deployment of 
community health workers was shown to significantly decrease hospitalization due to asthma 
amongst Black and Hispanic children who make up a disproportionate fraction of asthma 
hospitalizations (Woods et al., 2016), and a number of studies provide evidence-based 
programming to empower glycemic control amongst traditionally marginalized diabetic patients 
(Golden et al., 2017). However, few studies have looked at how hospitals can introduce broadly 
applicable initiatives to promote health equity. This paper addressing this gap in the literature to 
determine whether payment structures incentivizing care quality not only lead to better health for 
the overall population, but whether they also can be used as policy tools to ameliorate health 
disparities.  
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Literature Review 
I. Background 
One of the most notable equity-related healthcare reforms was The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, often referred to as “Obamacare”. A central component of 
the ACA was the expansion of Medicaid, the federal health insurance program primarily for low-
income individuals that is jointly funded by state and federal governments and administered 
through state Medicaid programs. The ACA allowed states to expand their Medicaid program to 
cover all adults with incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty line ($26,500 for a family of 4 in 
20212) beginning in 2014. In spite of substantial federal subsidies to pay for expansion, not all 
states in the U.S. adopted the expansion, causing significant variation in coverage across states. 
As of August 2020, 38 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Medicaid expansion, 
while 12 have not. Of the 38 states that have adopted the Medicaid expansion, three of them 
(Nebraska, Missouri, and Oklahoma) have not yet implemented it. Still, due to the ACA, the 
number of uninsured nonelderly Americans decreased from over 46.5 million in 2010, to 27.5 
million in 2018, making the ACA a key piece of legislation affecting health access and equity 
(Tolbert et al., 2019). 
Following the Affordable Care Act, a number of other healthcare reforms were 
implemented, marking a shift away from fee-for-service (FFS) payments and towards “value-
based” payment (VBP) models. Whereas FFS models reimburse hospitals and healthcare 
practitioners for each test ordered and each service provide, VBP models reimburse hospitals and 
providers for quality and lowered costs of care (“CMS’ Value-Based Programs”). In essence, 
 
2 See 2021 Poverty Guidelines from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: https://aspe.hhs.gov/2021-
poverty-guidelines  
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newer payment models continue to incentivize improved quality of care rather than greater 
quantity of care. Current value-based programs target improved quality and cost reduction across 
various domains, some are broadly focused on hospital quality while others aimed to reduce 
specific events such as readmissions or hospital-acquired infections, and still others incentivize 
an increase in usage of skilled nursing facilities and home health models.  
One example of a broad value-based program is Medicare’s Hospital Value Based 
Purchasing (HVBP) program, which adjusts Medicare payments to hospitals based on their 
performance on various domains that reflect hospital quality, including patient safety, patient 
experience, efficiency, cost-reduction, complication, and hospital-associated infections. When 
hospitals fail to meet certain quality point thresholds, a certain percentage of the total payment 
that the hospital should receive from Medicare is deducted. Hospitals are rewarded for meeting 
certain absolute thresholds and for improvements from year to year. While adjustments to the 
quality scoring criteria are made annually, one major component of the score is “Patient and 
Community Engagement,” which uses CMS’ Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey to assess improvements in areas such as doctor-patient 
communication, cultural competency, community reputation, and overall patient satisfaction. 
While HCAHPS was not intentionally developed to assess health equity, it does address some 
key barriers to health equity as cited in literature, particularly communication. 
In addition to Medicaid and Medicare-related health equity reform, various tax-related 
policies have also sought to improve health equity by requiring certain hospitals to invest in the 
communities they serve. Under Internal Revenue Service regulations, all 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
hospitals, which account for approximately 56% of all hospitals in the U.S. (“Hospitals by 
Ownership Type”) are also required to document their “community benefit” activities in 
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exchange for their tax-exempt status. These include absorbing the cost of care for patients who 
are uninsured or whose insurance plan pays less than the cost of care (common amongst patients 
with Medicaid), creation of programs to support social determinants of health, workforce 
development efforts, and advocacy funding, amongst many others. The ACA added to this, 
requiring all 501(c)(3) tax-exempt hospitals to also conduct a Community Health Needs 
Assessment (CHNA) every three years to better understand the needs of the communities they 
serve. They are also required to create and adopt an Implementation Strategy that discusses how 
the hospital plans to address concerns raised through the CHNA.  
The landscape of healthcare policy is changing rapidly to create programs and policies 
that incentivize better quality of care while also reducing healthcare costs. Through payment 
reform and tax policy, hospitals are having to change their processes of care to avoid financial 
penalties. Still, while the majority of policy is focused on improving aggregate health outcomes 
and reducing aggregate healthcare costs, little attention is paid to reducing health inequities 
specifically.  
 
II. Factors contributing to unequal health outcomes 
Public health researchers have studied the “social determinants of health” for decades, 
underscoring the role that structural factors – including access to healthy food, safe housing, a 
clean environment, and transportation access, to name a few – have on healthcare utilization and 
health outcomes (Kushel et al., 2006; Krieger and Higgins, 2002; Arcury et al., 2005, Nardone et 
al., 2020). In essence, differential access to “upstream” or structural, non-medical commodities 
such as food and clean air, causes “downstream” disparities in mental and physical health 
outcomes. This paper will not go into further detail about these upstream factors because their 
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effect is already well-known; rather, this paper will focus of hospital-level efforts that may 
ameliorate the negative impacts of social risk factors contributing to inequity. 
At the interpersonal level, a significant body of literature elucidates the role of unequal 
doctor-patient interactions that perpetuate health inequity. Sun et al.'s (2000) study found that 
Black patients had significantly lower patient satisfaction scores, and that a large reason for this 
dissatisfaction stemmed from poor communication. Notably, they cite poor explanation of key 
causes of the ailment, setting inaccurate expectations regarding wait times, not being told when 
to resume normal activities or return for a follow-up appointment, as being highly correlated 
with low overall patient satisfaction scores. Observing doctor-patient interactions to build on 
these findings Johnson et al. (2004) found that physicians were 23% more verbally dominant and 
33% less engaged in patient-centered communication with African American patients than with 
White patients. Similarly, Carrasquillo et al. (1999) conducted surveys 10 days after patients had 
an emergency room visit and found that non-English speakers were significantly more likely to 
report overall problems with care, communication, and testing, significantly less likely to be 
satisfied, and significantly less willing to return to the same emergency room. Given these 
barriers to communication, the quality of doctor-patient communication may suffer resulting in 
poorer treatment and worse health outcomes generally. One exception to this may be that Black 
individuals had lower deaths due to prescription opioids during the opioid crisis in the United 
States, but this was once again due to evidence of providers being less likely to recognize and 
address pain amongst Black patients, a marker of poor patient care (Alexander et al., 2018). 
Balsa and McGuire (2003) outline three potential mechanisms through which doctor-patient 
relationships may produce racially discriminatory patterns of health: 1. bias (or prejudice) 
against minorities, 2. greater clinical uncertainty when interacting with minority patients (e.g. not 
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knowing how to interpret their presentation of symptoms), and 3. beliefs (or stereotypes) held by 
the provider about the behavior or health of minorities.  
Studies document that physicians do indeed exhibit different treatment patterns based on 
the patient’s gender and race. In a landmark paper, Schulman et al. (1999) found that female 
patients and Black patients were 40% less likely than male patients and White patients, 
respectively, to be recommended for cardiac catherization when they presented with the same 
symptoms of chest pain. Conversely, the physician’s gender has also been shown to cause 
problematic differential treatment patterns based in race and gender stereotypes rather than 
clinical necessity; male physicians have been shown to prescribe significantly higher doses of 
narcotics to White and male patients, while female physicians have been shown to prescribe 
significantly higher doses of narcotics to Black and female patients (Weisse et al., 2001). While 
the exact reasons why these gendered and racialized differences exist is difficult to pinpoint, 
studies have shown that patient’s race and socioeconomic status are associated with the 
physicians' assessment of patient’s intelligence, feelings of affiliation toward the patient, and 
beliefs about the patient's likelihood of risky behavior and adherence with medical advice (van 
Ryn and Burke, 2000).  
A few studies have tried to better understand the associations between patient satisfaction 
and health outcomes, but they all use varying definitions of patient satisfaction and have mixed 
results. Using HCAHPS data, some find that larger hospital size, high surgical volume, and low 
mortality are positively associated with patient satisfaction (Kennedy et al., 2014), others find 
that higher patient satisfaction is associated with less emergency department use but with greater 
inpatient use, and higher overall health care and prescription drug expenditures (Fenton et al., 
2012). However, Kennedy and Fenton’s papers do not disaggregate by race and gender, and do 
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not look at health inequity. More recently, researchers using MEPS (Medical Expenditures Panel 
Survey) data found that patients who were younger, male, Black, on Medicaid, and patients with 
lower socioeconomic status were more likely to report poor satisfaction, and while physical 
health was not associated with patient satisfaction, patients with poor mental health and those 
who had at least two emergency department visits per year were significantly more likely to have 
poor overall satisfaction (Chen et al., 2019). This paper was able to show that some demographic 
groups do indeed report lower satisfaction on standardized surveys, corroborating earlier 
aforementioned research on racial disparities in doctor-patient communication, but does not link 
patient satisfaction with health equity measures; rather it looks at individual-level health. 
Research is therefore needed to understand whether better patient satisfaction on average is also 
associated with greater health equity. This paper quantifies associations between metro area-level 
hospital quality averages and health inequity, broadening the literature from person-level 
associations to population-level associations.  
Patterns of community benefit spending by hospitals is an area of research that is 
relatively understudied in spite of its potentially large impact on population health and health 
equity. Community benefit spending is typically aimed at providing healthcare for medically 
underserved community members, whether through pro-bono care or through innovative 
programming that addresses social determinants of health. The Affordable Care Act gained the 
support of many hospitals because the expansion of Medicaid coverage would save hospitals 
considerable money that would otherwise go uncompensated care. Retrospective studies found 
uncompensated care costs decreased from 4.1 percentage points to 3.1 percentage points of total 
operating costs in states that did expand Medicaid, and that the cost of uncompensated care could 
have decreased by nearly 2% of total operating costs in non-expansion states, had they chosen to 
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expand Medicaid (Dranove et al., 2016). While one would expect that these savings from 
uncompensated care would be redirected toward more community health improvement 
programs, studies showed that in the years immediately after the ACA went into effect, 
community benefit spending increased only marginally (Young et al., 2018). Furthermore, not 
only did total community benefit spending barely increase, but direct community investments, a 
subsection of total community benefit spending, also barely changed in spite of the ACA’s 
requirement of conducting a Community Health Needs Assessment (CHNA) to guide direct 
community health spending (Chaiyachati et al., 2018; Kanter et al., 2020). This shows that 
hospitals’ direct community spending is not yet aligned with the social needs of the communities 
they serve, and hospitals investments in their communities are lagging in spite of their potential 
to improve population health and reduce healthcare costs. Little literature exists to elucidate the 
connection between the average amount spent by hospitals in any given region on providing 
direct community benefits and health equity in those hospitals’ service areas. For one, the 
directionality of the relationship is also unknown; it is unclear whether communities where 
hospitals that have spent more on direct community benefits have higher health equity scores, or 
whether high direct community benefit spending is indicative of and in response to low health 
equity in surrounding communities. This paper uses multiple linear regressions to establish 
associations between metropolitan area-level per capita community benefit spending and average 
health outcomes and health equity. 
In summary, while literature has shown race and gender-based disparities exist in doctor-
patient communication, patient satisfaction scores, and treatment and prescription patterns, there 
is a lack of research that connects whether incentivizing patient communication improves health 
outcomes or health equity in particular. Furthermore, little research has been done to understand 
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the role of community benefit spending as a potential lever to foster community-level health 
equity. Given that Medicare’s Hospital Value Based Purchasing program incentivizes patient 
satisfaction, clinical quality, and cost reduction, the policy could have spurred hospitals to 
improve their outreach to medically underserved populations and groups that have 
disproportionately poor health outcomes, although the extent of the policy’s impact on health 
equity is largely unknown. Connecting these ideas, this paper will use multiple linear regressions 
to understand whether greater hospital patient communication scores and/or community benefit 
spending are associated with better average health outcomes and reduced disparities. It also 
utilizes a difference-in-differences model to evaluate the Hospital Value Based Purchasing 
program’s impact on health outcomes, health equity, and benefit spending patterns, to inform 
whether value-based policies in health care are effective in guiding hospitals’ financial decision-
making and performance regarding health inequity. 
 
Data and Model 
The health of an individual is contingent on social, political, and economic drivers that 
exist from the interpersonal level to the national level. The persistence of health inequity is, in 
many cases, not only a result of interpersonal discrimination, but structural racism, sexism, and 
classism that perpetuate inequity. This thesis investigates whether using policy levers 
incentivizing better communication with patients, as implemented with Medicare’s Hospital 
Value-Based Purchasing Program improves aggregate health outcomes, promotes health equity, 
and increases hospital-level community benefit spending. In theory, financial incentives to 
promote patient communication might not only improve health outcomes for the whole 
population, but may have a differential, more positive effect on health outcomes for marginalized 
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groups who have experienced disproportionately poor communication, thus improving health 
equity in addition to average population health outcomes. Furthermore, hospitals that seek to 
improve their scores for patient communication may attempt a wide range of initiatives to 
improve patient satisfaction, including increasing their community benefits spending in ways that 
their patient population would directly experience.  
 This study takes advantage of state-level variation in the application of HVBP policy to 
conduct a quasi-experimental policy analysis. The state of Maryland is the only state that was 
exempt from the HVBP program, providing an opportunity to compare various outcomes of 
interest between Maryland and other states in the pre-HVBP and post-HVBP periods. Maryland 
operates the nation’s only all-payer hospital rate regulation system which has been in place since 
1977. Under this system, all insurers in Maryland reimburse hospitals at the same rate, differing 
from other states in which commercial insurers typically reimburse hospitals at a much higher 
rate than Medicaid and Medicare. In July 2009, Maryland implemented a Quality-Based 
Reimbursement (QBR) program that uses very similar rate-setting measures to the federal 
Medicare HVBP program that was established a few years later in October 2012. Because of 
Maryland’s long-standing Medicare waiver for its all-payer rate-setting system and the 
implementation of the QBR program, CMS has granted Maryland an exemption from 
participation in HVBP.  
 The crux of this paper relies on this state-level variation to conduct three key difference-
in-differences models to understand whether the HVBP policy led to meaningful changes in 
health outcomes, health equity, and community benefit spending. For the purposes of this paper, 
the pre-treatment, or baseline period is 2010 – 2011 and the treatment period is 2013 – 2016. The 
year 2012 is eliminated from all analyses because HVBP was implemented in the latter half of 
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the year, contaminating results. Because Maryland implemented a similar statewide policy a 
couple of years prior to HVBP, it is hypothesized that during the baseline period individuals 
living in Maryland will have experienced better average health outcomes and less health 
inequity, and also that hospitals in Maryland will have spent more on community benefit 
spending per capita than those in other states. Therefore, over the course of the treatment period, 
the difference in key variables of interest between Maryland, used as the control group, and the 
states in the treatment group is estimated to shrink.  
The states selected as treatment states for the purposes of these difference-in-differences 
regressions are Louisiana, Georgia, Virginia, Delaware, North Carolina and New Jersey. These 
states were chosen as a match for Maryland based on state-level demographic data. The 
treatment states were the closest matches to Maryland based on per capita income, per capita 
GDP, percent white, percent Hispanic, and percent Black. Percent female and average life 
expectancy were comparable for all of the states. Table 1.1 shows key summary statistics for 
individuals in the treatment and control groups during the first year of the pre-treatment period 
(2010).3 It is important to note that Maryland had implemented a Medicaid eligibility expansion 
under the Affordable Care Act in January 2014, but this was not the case for all of the states 
chosen for the treatment group. Table 1.2 shows the timeline of Medicaid expansion for all of the 
states in the treatment and control groups. 






Average Population a 5785982 6924063.83 
Average Per Capita GDP a 56531.23 54140.50 
Average Annual Income a 50007 40932 
Percent White b 61.12 68.96 
 
3 In this table, the number of individuals (n) shown for control and treatment refers to the number of individuals in 
the CDC BRFSS dataset which is used in regression analysis. The data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is 
largely used for state-by-state comparisons to determine treatment and control groups. 
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Percent Black b 30.89 24.20 
Percent Hispanic b 8.19 9.22 
Median Age b 38 37.32 
Percent Female b 51.6 51.19 
Percent Non-HS Graduates b 6.89 10.2 
   
Sources: a Bureau of Economic Analysis, Quarterly GDP and Personal Income by 
State (2010); b CDC Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (2010) 
 
Table 1.2 Status of Medicaid Expansion, Treatment vs. Control States 
Cohort State Date Medicaid Expansion Implemented 
Control MD Jan. 2014 
Treatment 
NJ Jan. 2014 
DE Jan. 2014 
LA Jul. 2016 
VA Jan. 2019 
GA Not Yet Expanded 
NC Not Yet Expanded 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) Status of State Medicaid Expansion 
Decisions Interactive Map. https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-
state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/  
  
Equation 1 shows the difference-in-differences regression that was conducted to 
understand whether there was a significantly different change in individuals’ average healthy 
days in states exposed to HVBP when compared to individuals in Maryland, which was exempt 
from HVBP.4 The HVBP term is an indicator variable for individuals living in the 
aforementioned treatment states. 𝑋!"# is a vector of individual characteristics including age, 
gender, race, educational attainment, income, and insurance coverage. The term l# captures year 
fixed effects and µ" indicates state fixed effects. 
(1) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦	𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠! =	𝐵$ + 𝐵%𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 +	𝐵&𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵'𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 + 𝑋!"# +	l# + µ"	 
 
4 All data analysis for this paper was conducted using STATA SE, Version 16.1. 
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This paper adds to the existing literature on health disparities and health equity by comparing 
three measures of “health disadvantage”. The term “health disadvantage” is used here as an 
umbrella term encompassing measures of both disparity and inequity. 
1. Weighted Absolute Disparity (WAD): 3𝑦!,) − 𝑦*5 6
&, in which larger deviations from the 
mean of the state’s average number of healthy days (both positive and negative) for a 
given year are weighted more heavily. (Derived from Gakidou et al.'s (2000) 
Individual/Mean Differences formula). 




, in which an individual’s weighted 
difference from the average number of healthy days for the state in which they live is 
relative to the state’s average number of healthy days for that year. In other words, a 
larger absolute difference is more pertinent if the state’s healthy days average was low to 
begin with. (Derived from Gakidou et al.'s (2000) Individual/Mean Differences formula). 





, which is similar to measure 3, but the 
comparison is made to the average number of healthy days of the most socially privileged 
group in each state for that year. An a priori assumption is made that the most socially 
advantaged group in every state is non-Hispanic White men in the highest income 
category. (Derived from Zimmerman's (2019) Health Equity Metric). Furthermore, this is 
solely a measure of health poorer than that of the average of the most socially privileged 
group; all individuals with healthy days higher than the average of non-Hispanic White 
men in the top income category receive a “0” for this score. 
Regression 2 parallels regressions 1, but instead of healthy days as the dependent variable, 
health disadvantage is the dependent variable. 
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(2) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒! =	𝐵$ + 𝐵%𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 +	𝐵&𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵'𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 +𝑋!"# +
	l# + µ"	  
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the longitudinal data with disparity and inequity 
measures calculated using state-level averages for each year. Notable differences are that the 
control state has a higher percentage of college graduates, individuals in the highest income 
group, and individuals who are employed. Maryland residents had significantly more healthy 
days per month and significantly less WAD and WRI in both the pre-treatment and post-
treatment periods. 
 





(2013 - 2016)   





White  (%) 72.66 71.85 67.74 69.62   
College Graduate (%) 34.93 41.63 37.36 44.74   
Income  <$15,000 (%) 9.78 5.38 8.50 5.35   
Income > $49,999 (%) 37.60 48.48 39.86 48.97   
Has Health Insurance (%) 87.89 92.33 89.34 94.87   
Employed a (%) 42.48 49.98 43.03 42.42   
Healthy Days 23.09 23.99*** 23.26 23.88*** 0.00 30.00 
 (10.84) (10.10) (10.62) (10.05)   
Weighted Absolute 
Disparity 117.29 102.029*** 112.61 100.9157*** 0.00 900 
 (177.29) (180.06) (176.20) (176.60)   
Weighted Relative 
Disparity 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.00 1.00 
 (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31)   
Weighted Relative Inequity 0.17 0.143*** 0.16 0.143*** 0.00 1.00 
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33)   
       
N (# of individuals) 106,236 19,302 253,772 87,785   
Note: a Refers to the percent of individuals earning wages and self-employed individuals. 
Universe includes students, retirees, homemakers, those unable to work, and those out of work. 
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The final difference-in-differences equation examines whether community benefit 
spending changed significantly more in treatment states relative to Maryland. Community 
benefit encompasses programs or activities that provide health-related services in response to 
identified community needs. Community benefit programs have a special focus on the 
disadvantaged populations and must be available to the broad community. According to the 
IRS, to count as a community benefit, a program or activity must respond to a demonstrated 
health-related community need and seek to achieve at least one community benefit objective: 
increase access to health services, enhance public health, advance knowledgeable through 
education or research, or relieve or reduce a burden of government to improve health. This 
paper analyzes four subtypes of community benefit spending, namely community health 
improvement services, community building activities, unreimbursed Medicaid and bad debt. 
Community health improvement services are conducted with the explicit purpose of 
improving health and do not generate revenue for the hospital. Community building activities 
are those which take measures to improve health and safety and typically refers to efforts 
tackling “upstream” social determinants of health such as education, environment, housing, 
and food.5 Unreimbursed Medicaid refers to the difference between the total cost that the 
hospital bears to provide care for Medicaid patient and the Medicaid payments received by 
the hospital. Bad debt is the total cost of services for which a hospital anticipated payment 
but did not receive it. Whereas unreimbursed Medicaid can be considered financial 
assistance/charity care, bad debt is money that the hospital involuntarily loses due to 
unrecovered costs. While bad debt is financially unfavorable for hospitals, it is possible that 
 
5 Examples of community building activities include physical improvements like housing rehabilitation, economic 
development through the creation of job training programs, educational investments such as mentoring programs, 
environmental efforts to reduce air or water pollution, and more. See 
http://www.communitybenefitinsight.org/?page=info.glossary#glossary_3 for more details. 
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greater bad debt may actually translate to better health or fewer health disparities on average 
because it would be indicative of individuals seeking medical care even when they cannot 
afford to pay for it. Still, whether hospitals taking on more bad debt translates to better 
patient outcomes is unknown, and the relationship may determine whether bad debt should 
be incentivized at the policy level or whether internal management efforts at the hospital 
level may be necessary to reduce bad debt. 
To evaluate community benefit spending patterns, this paper uses hospital level data and 
keeps the same pre- and post- period timeframes as above to see whether states in the 
treatment group had significantly greater changes in community benefit spending. It was 
hypothesized that states that experienced HVBP would invest more in their communities 
through various forms of community benefit spending in order to increase their HCAHPS 
patient ratings and to have better clinical outcomes. Table 3.2 shows hospital community 
benefit spending trends of hospitals located in treatment and control states at 3-year intervals 
from 2010 to 2016. In 2010, hospitals in treatment states spent an average of $36.2 million 
on community benefits, and hospitals in Maryland (control) spent an average of $25.5 
million. In both treatment and control states, total community benefit spending increased on 
average. Also interestingly, healthcare access increased markedly in treatment states; the 
percent of hospitals that were the sole community provider in a certain radius dropped from 
8.011% to 0%  in treatment states from 2010 to 2016. Table 3.3 in the Appendix contains the 
same summary statistics but only compares the pre-period and the post-period, rather than 
point-in-time figures for three years.  
(3) 𝐶𝐵	𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔! 	= 𝐵" + 𝐵#𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃 + 𝐵$𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵%𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑉𝐵𝑃	 + 𝑋&'( +	l( + µ'	 
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Regression 3 parallels the prior two regressions, but instead of analyzing person-level data, 
it uses hospital-level data. Xist is a vector of hospital characteristics including whether or not the 
hospital is a sole community provider, in an urban setting, a teaching hospital, in a state that 
expanded Medicaid, or in a state that requires community benefit spending. The regression also 
includes time (l#) and state (µ") fixed effects. 
Table 3.2 Hospital Benefit Spending Characteristics (Thousands of $), 2010 – 2016  
 2010 2013 2016 
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Total Community Benefits 36204.794 25547.955 44024.205 33659.556 57540.630 32443.737* 
 (79914.44) (79914.44) (79914.44) (79914.44) (79914.44) (79914.44) 
Unreimbursed Medicaid 8304.158 222.470*** 8157.438 621.082*** 16613.751 746.104*** 
 (12599.86) (776.19) (19495.43) (2791.01) (27824.56) (1549.93) 
Community Health 
Improvement 1322.310 2720.598*** 2374.530 3113.184 2020.695 3996.174*** 
 (2569.56) (4406.43) (6576.24) (4663.45) (4386.60) (6997.87) 
Community Building 
Activities 146.559 735.526*** 220.938 379.345* 271.102 582.331* 
 (478.34) (1544.75) (530.21) (558.53) (1078.58) (846.99) 
Bad Debt 10898.85 11657.83* 25463.42 15190.21** 33779.75 11169.44*** 
 (13188.64) (11860.89) (32873.85) (16667.74) (47408.52) (10034.33) 
Sole Community Provider 
(%) 8.01186944 0 7.58017493 0 0 0 
Urban Hospital (%) 74.7774481 93.4782609 74.9271137 93.75 76.2048193 93.75 
Teaching Hospital (%) 34.7181009 39.1304348 35.8600583 37.5 36.1445783 37.5 
ACA Expansion State (%) 33.2344214 100 33.5276968 100 33.7349398 100 
State Requires Community 
Benefits (%) 85.1632047 100 84.2565598 100 83.7349398 100 
       
N 337 46 343 48 332 48 
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Results 
Prior to running difference-in-difference regressions to evaluate the effect of HVBP, a 
few preliminary regressions using Micropolitan/Metropolitan Statistical Area6 (MMSA)-level 
data were conducted to characterize relationships between hospital performance for patient 
experience, hospital community benefits, and health outcomes and inequities. All of these 
regressions were multiple linear regressions conducted using 2016 numbers from HCAHPS, 
BRFSS (specifically the MMSA-level SMART dataset), and community benefit datasets. These 
regressions provided insight into the directionality of associations between these variables; it 
enabled an understanding of whether better patient communication scores (measured using the 
aforementioned HCAHPS survey) and more community benefit spending were indeed positively 
associated with health outcomes (Healthy Days) and negatively associated with health disparities 
(using the 3 aforementioned measures). Greater detail on these multiple linear regressions can be 
found in the Appendix. To summarize, individuals living in MMSA’s where hospitals scored 
better on HCAHPS had clinically negligible differences in healthy days compared to those that 
scored worse. Additionally, there were mixed results as to whether greater MMSA HCAHPS 
averages were correlated with less disparities as measured by WAD and WRD, and there was no 
significant association between MMSA-level HCAHPS scores and WRI, suggesting that more 
targeted efforts may be needed to reduce inequity, which is more rooted in social justice 
frameworks than disparity is. Interestingly, greater community benefit spending was significantly 
associated with more healthy days and less health disadvantage across all three measures suggest 
 
6 The acronym “MMSA” refers to metropolitan statistical areas, micropolitan statistical areas, and metropolitan 
divisions. These geographic subdivisions are designated by the U. S. Office of Management and Budget and used by 
the U. S. Census Bureau as of June 2003. The general concept of a metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area is 
that of a core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent communities and all having a 
high degree of economic and social integration. For addition information, see 
https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/smart/smart_faq.htm  
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that community benefit spending may potentially be a channel through which hospitals can 
address health disparities and inequities. 
 These regressions illuminated the associations between various hospital patterns and 
outcomes of interest but did not prove causality. The following sections discuss the results of the 
difference-in-differences regressions which evaluate HVBP for its impact on healthy days, health 
disadvantages, and community benefit spending.  
I. Effect on Healthy Days 
Table 6.1 shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression with healthy days as 
the outcome variable. Regression (1), without any demographic controls or state-level fixed 
effects, shows a significant increase in healthy days by 0.115 days per month (p<0.01) as a result 
of the policy. Adding demographic and socioeconomic controls in regression 2 shows an even 
more pronounced intervention effect of 0.173 more healthy days per month (p<0.01) on average. 
Adding state and year fixed effects in regression 3 slightly reduces the treatment effect, but it is 
still significant (0.140; p<0.01). Further stratifying the regression by low-income and higher-
income groups shows that the improvement in healthy days as a result of the policy was more 
than twice as large for individuals in the lowest income groups (those earning less than $25,000 
per year) as it was for individuals in the highest income group (those earning more than $50,000 
per year) (Regressions 4 and 5, respectively). For low-income patients, those in treatment states 
had 0.297 more healthy days on average than those in control states (p<0.01). In contrast, 
patients in the highest income group saw an intervention effect Limiting the regression to only 
White respondents and only non-White respondents showed that the treatment effect was 
significant and positive, but only for White individuals. In fact, there was no significant change 
in healthy days for non-White respondents at all. Limiting the regression even more to only 
 Kadiyala 31 
Black individuals showed a decrease in Healthy Days by 0.195 Healthy Days per month (p<0.1). 
Thus, while the HVBP may have been effective at reducing income-related disparities, it did not 
seem to improve race-related disparities independent of income and may even have increased 
race-based disparities given that the increase was driven largely by White individuals. 
 
II. Effect on Health Disadvantages 
Next, the paper evaluated whether HVBP led to significant decreases in health disadvantages 
using three different measures. In each case, adding demographic controls increased the 
treatment effect but adding state and year fixed effects reduced the treatment effect (Table 6.2). 
Across the board, the policy seemed to significantly decrease this disadvantage, whether it was 
measures as weighted absolute disparity, weighted relative disparity, or weighted relative 
inequity. In 2010, individual weighted absolute disparity ranged from 0 to 638.21, and the 
treatment reduced weighted absolute disparity by an average of 3.58 points (p<0.01) after adding 
controls and fixed effects. Similarly, weighted relative disparity (range 0,1) decreased by 0.007 
points (p<0.01) and weighted relative inequity (range 0,1) decreased by 0.006 (p<0.01) as a 
result of the treatment, after adding controls and state fixed effects. 
 
III. Effect on Community Benefit Spending  
Previous MLR regressions established significant positive correlations with all forms of per 
capita community benefit spending and Healthy Days within an MMSA, as well as significant 
negative correlations between per capita benefit spending and health disparities and inequities 
(Appendix). Given the evidence that community benefit spending improves health outcomes 
and reduces disparities, it followed that HVBP, which would reward hospitals for improving 
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patient outcomes, should theoretically also spur hospitals to spend more in community benefits. 
Table 6.3 shows the impact of HVBP on hospital community benefit spending patterns using a 
difference-in-differences model. However, the model showed no significant changes in total 
community benefit spending, unreimbursed Medicaid spending, or community health 
improvement services and community benefit operations spending. Interestingly, only 
community building activities and bad debt spending changed (both increased) significantly as a 
result of HVBP. Community building activities spending was $202,256 higher on average for 
hospitals located in treatment states in the post-period after adding hospital and state-level 
controls (p<0.05). This increased to $207,776 after adding both state and year fixed effects 
(p<0.05). Average hospital bad debt was also significantly higher in treatment states than 
control states in the post-intervention period. Hospitals in treatment states had an average of 
$14.1 million more in bad debt (p<0.01) than those in control states after adding state and year 
fixed effects. However, looking at the bad debt-to-revenue ratio shows no significant difference 
between treatment and control states after program implementation. Thus, while hospitals in 
treatment states had significantly greater average bad debt than those in control states in the 
post-period, they also had proportionally greater revenue.  
 
Discussion 
 This paper utilized difference-in-differences models to understand whether Medicare’s 
Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program was effective in terms improving health outcomes, 
reducing health inequities, or shifting hospital spending to prioritize community. The HVBP 
program, which imposed payment incentives by withholding a certain percentage of Medicare 
reimbursement to hospitals failing to improve in areas including clinical quality and patient 
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experience, was particularly of interest because these incentives were specifically designed 
improve health outcomes. However, whether these incentives also led to decreases in health 
disparities and health inequity, and whether they encouraged hospitals to reallocate money 
towards community health efforts to address “upstream” social determinants of health is largely 
unknown. Using Maryland as the control state due to its exclusion from the HVBP program, the 
model ascertained whether there was any significant divergence in these three areas between 
treatment and control states in the post-intervention period (2012 – 2016), compared to the pre-
intervention period (2010 – 2011). 
 The findings suggest that the program successfully increased average healthy days, 
showing that financial incentives that align with value-based purchasing are indeed successful at 
improving health at a high level. The Healthy Days measure is not as specific as a clinical 
marker of health status, but it is also more specific than a long-term measure such as life 
expectancy. The fact that it is derived from surveys through which individuals quantify their own 
health status enables individuals to have agency over their representation in healthcare datasets. 
It also allows for a more holistic view of health as “a state of complete physical, mental, and 
social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity,” as defined by the World 
Health Organization. The fact that HVBP not only led to aggregate improvements in Healthy 
Days, but also had more beneficial effects for individuals in the lowest income groups is 
encouraging for policymakers who are hoping to eliminate income-based disparities in health. 
Still, the lack of significant improvements in Healthy Days for non-White individuals while 
White individuals experienced significant improvements suggests that HVBP was not effective 
at mitigating race-based disparities. In fact, further disaggregating “Non-White” showed that 
Black individuals actually experienced a decrease in Healthy Days. Thus, while HVBP may have 
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successfully improved aggregate Healthy Days and closed income-based inequities, it has been 
ineffective at closing racial inequities, particularly the health gap between white and Black 
individuals. This study supports previous findings by Zimmerman et al. (2019) showing a clear 
lack of progress on health equity in the United States in the past two decades. Consequently, 
there is an urgent need for value-based purchasing policies that explicitly incentivize hospitals, 
payers, and health systems to decrease health inequities broadly, and specifically inequitable 
outcomes driven by racial inequities.  
 The Economics literature remains relatively sparse in terms of offering standardized 
quantitative measures of inequity that are rooted in Sociology and social justice-related 
disciplines. Thus, this paper attempted to compare various statistical measures to see whether the 
measure being used paints a different picture of how HVBP affected health disparities or health 
inequities. Weighted Absolute Disparity and Weighted Relative Disparity are more “objective” 
measures; in essence, they compare an individual’s health status to that of the average for the 
individual’s state of residence for any given year. Using these measures, both absolute and 
relative disparity showed significant decreases as a result of HVBP implementation, further 
supporting previous results looking at changes in Healthy Days. Weighted Relative Inequity, 
which calculates the difference between an individual’s Healthy Days and the average of the 
most socially privileged group (White men in the highest income group) in any state and year, 
also saw a decrease after the policy was implemented. While these statistically significant results 
are encouraging, they lack economic significance in that the regression coefficients on 
Post*Treat rounded to approximately 0.01 for both relative measures and only 3.58 for the 
absolute measure (ranged from 0 to 638.21). This suggests that more targeted efforts to 
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proactively and intentionally reduce health inequities are necessary to see economically 
meaningful reductions in health disparities at the state-level.  
 To supplement this analysis, this paper sought to understand whether MMSA average 
HCAHPS scores are correlated with Healthy Days, health disparities, and healthy inequity for 
individuals living within those MMSA’s. In theory, if HCAHPS scores as they are currently used 
are indeed correlated with these outcome variables, they may be a potential channel through 
which Medicare could incentivize better HCAHPS performance, and thus improve health 
outcomes and close health gaps. Unfortunately, the results were mixed; while some HCAHPS 
measures showed positive correlations with Healthy Days, some showed negative correlations. 
Furthermore, while HCAHPS scores were significantly negatively correlated with some 
measures of health disparity (specifically Weighted, Absolute Disparity), other measures showed 
no significant associations or some significant associations, but with varying directionality. This 
is not to say that HCAHPS is a poor measure for Medicare to use to incentivize hospitals to 
reduce health disparities. Rather, aggregating HCAHPS at the MMSA-level is likely too large of 
an area to be able to draw any meaningful conclusions. Further research should be done to see if 
hospitals’ HCAHPS scores are correlated with improved Healthy Days, health disparities, and 
health inequities among the hospitals’ patient populations specifically, rather than the MMSA at-
large.  
 Along similar lines, a couple of MLR models were run to see if MMSA-level community 
benefit spending patterns were associated with Healthy Days, health disparities, or health 
inequity. By looking at whether MMSA’s average benefit spending was correlated health 
outcomes or disparities, this analysis sought to elucidate whether policies incentivizing 
community benefit spending could be beneficial to improving health outcomes and closing 
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health gaps. Greater per capita benefit spending, both total and all sub-categories) were 
significantly correlated with more Healthy Days and less disparity and inequity. This suggests 
that policies incentivizing more community benefit spending may indeed be critical to improving 
not only aggregate health outcomes, but to eliminating health gaps. Community building 
activities were associated with the greatest “return” per dollar invested, with dramatic 
improvements in Healthy Days and reductions in all three measures of health disadvantage. This 
suggests that community benefit spending may indeed be a channel through which hospitals can 
contribute to population health efforts seeking to improve aggregate health and reduce health 
disparities. Given this, it is certainly encouraging that there was a significant increase in 
community benefit spending dollars after HVBP was implemented, but an even greater 
investment in community building activities may be even more beneficial. Specifically, investing 
more in community building activities may be prudent for hospitals, especially as the shift 
toward value-based care becomes more of a priority and hospitals experience a greater financial 
incentive to improve population health. 
 
Limitations 
While this paper shows promising results, it also has significant limitations that must be 
acknowledged in order to view these results in as objective a light as possible. As most natural 
experiments in the healthcare space go, there are numerous confounding factors and co-occurring 
policy changes that may have skewed results. First, Maryland is not a perfect control because it 
is the only state with an all-payer hospital rate regulation system, which has been in place for 
nearly 40 years. Under this system, both public and private insurers reimburse at the same rates, 
and thus have the same degree of incentives to reduce unnecessary healthcare spending. 
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Furthermore, this paper assumes parallel trends in the years before the documented pre-period 
years (2010-2011) which may not necessarily be true. The implementation of Maryland’s own 
Quality-Based Reimbursement (QBR) program in 2009 may have led to the state’s divergence 
from the rest of the nation in the years that followed immediately, thus potentially violating this 
trend. Figures 2a to 2d do indeed show slight divergences in trends for Healthy Days and the 
three measures of health disparities starting in 2010. Thus, the difference-in-differences estimate 
is imperfect and difficult to interpret on its own, but does still offer a glimpse of the extent to 
which the outcomes of interest converge in the post-intervention years. Additionally, the 
Affordable Care Act went into effect in 2010, and introduced a number of sweeping reforms 
across the country. This included prohibiting denial of coverage of individuals based on pre-
existing conditions, allowing some states to expand Medicaid eligibility, and mandating non-
profit hospitals to conduct Community Health Needs Assessments (CHNA’s) and use the 
information gathered to formulate a 3-year plan to address the identified community needs. For 
the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the ACA affected both control and treatment states 
in similar ways and to similar extents. Still, it is possible that the ACA actually had differential 
effects on treatment and control states, so it would be prudent to interpret the treatment effect 
estimates as the result of multiple policy changes, including the ACA and HVBP, and not 
entirely the HVBP alone.  
Future research in this area should use hospital data for more geographic precision to 
evaluate the impact of community benefit spending on nearby areas. As healthcare providers and 
communities prioritize health equity, a deeper understanding of community benefit spending and 
its ability to serve as a tool to achieve equity will be necessary. Additional studies on public-
private partnerships between health systems and local departments of public health and the ways 
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in which both sectors can capitalize on their strengths to bolster community health are needed to 
set best practices and evidence-based incentives. It will also be interesting to see the types of 




Overall, better patient communication and more community benefit spending are shown 
to be positively correlated with Healthy Days and negatively correlated with multiple measures 
of health disparities. This suggests that lawmakers should consider incentivizing patient 
communication and community benefit spending in order to improve population health, 
especially amongst medically underserved communities and communities that have 
disproportionately poor health outcomes. The paper also showed that value-based policies such 
as the Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program led to greater benefit spending, more Healthy 
Days, and smaller health gaps. Interestingly, the policy was successful in reducing income-based 
health gaps far more than race-based health gaps, calling for more targeted policy solutions to 
specifically mitigate racial health disparities in addition to broader programming to reduce 
inequities generally. Additionally, while the three measures of health disparities did show similar 
trends, the inequity measure that was based more in a social justice framework (WRI) generally 
had weaker associations with patient communication scores and community benefit spending. 
Thus, while shrinking disparities generally may be more attainable through improving patient 
communication and increasing community benefit, adding nuance to the conversation by 
addressing inequity, which requires grappling with racial, political, sociological, and economic 
structures, will be a much larger challenge for healthcare policymakers. 
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 Still, this paper shows promising results; not only did HVBP lead to improvements in 
health and health disparities, but it shows that hospitals can and should be invested in addressing 
community health. Whether that involves racial bias in healthcare communication training for 
providers or partnering with local non-profits to provide food and housing assistance for patients, 
hospitals play a key part in solving the crisis of health inequity in the United States.  
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(2013 - 2016) 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Benefit Spending (millions $)     
 Total Community Benefits  37.50 27.40 55.80 33.90*** 
  (81.10) (32.70) (90.60) (42.50) 
 Unreimbursed Medicaid  8.15 0.18*** 14.30 .52*** 
  (11.70) (19.50) (26.70) (2.05) 
 Comm. Health Improv. 1.46 2.93*** 2.06 3.67*** 
  (2.87) (4.67) (5.84) (5.84) 
 Community Building Activities 0.17 .65*** 0.21 0.53*** 
  (0.49) (1.30) (0.67) (0.79) 
 Bad Debt 14.70 12.20 31.80 11.90*** 
  (20.40) (11.20) (45.10) (11.10) 
Other Hospital Characteristics     
 
State ACA Expansion 138% FPL 
(%) 33% 100% 35% 100% 
 State Requires CB Reporting (%) 85% 100% 84% 100% 
 Urban (%) 75% 93% 77% 93% 
 Sole Community Provider (%) 6% 0% 3% 0% 
 Teaching Hospital (%) 35% 39% 37% 36% 
      
 N 674 92 1,823 255 
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Table 6.1 DND Effect of HVBP on Healthy Days 
 All <$25,000 >$50,000 White  Non-White  Black  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
post 0.17*** -0.14***  -0.02 -0.07*** -0.01 0.05 0.38*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
treat -0.142*** -0.25***  -0.41*** -0.27*** -0.22*** 0.32*** 0.59*** 
 (0.03) (0.0331)  (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) 
Post x Treat 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.29*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.06 -0.19* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) 
All Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Constant 23.23*** 18.99*** 18.99*** 22.31*** 25.58*** 24.91*** 25.13*** 25.22*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0362) (0.0380) (0.0679) (0.0498) (0.0384) (0.0606) (0.110) 
         
Observations 2,841,738 2,841,368 2,841,368 701,020 1,071,434 2,180,390 660,978 224,942 




Table 6.2 DND Effect of HVBP on Health Disparities 
 WAD WAD WAD WRD WRD WRD WRI WRI WRI 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
                    
post -2.27*** 2.13***  -0.01*** 0.00**  -0.004*** 0.004***  
 (0.232) (0.226)  (0.000428) (0.000418)  (0.00) (0.00)  
treat 6.50*** 8.30***  0.01*** 0.02***  0.01*** 0.01***  
 (0.56) (0.552)  (0.00105) (0.00102)  (0.00) (0.00)  
post_treat -3.37*** -4.11*** -3.57*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.70) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 110.8*** 160.7*** 161.2*** 0.208*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.163*** 0.277*** 0.278*** 
 (0.18) (0.60) (0.63) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
          
All Controls N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
State FE N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Year FE N N Y N N Y N N Y 
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(Post x Treat), Fixed 
Effect Model 4.880 3.607 -0.147 0.207** 14.051*** 0.050 
 (10.05) (2.394) (0.561) (0.091) (4.136) (0.063) 
Observations 2,299 2,299 2,299 2,299 2,299 2,299 
R-squared 0.090 0.055 0.037 0.014 0.088 0.008 
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Appendix 
 
Additional Characterization Regressions 
Data and Model 
The first multiple linear regressions were conducted to illuminate associations between 
health outcomes, health equity, and the quality of patient communication and community benefit 
spending at various hospitals. Where noted, measures of hospital quality and hospital benefit 
spending were aggregated to the Metropolitan/Micropolitan Statistical Area (MMSA) level, as 
this is the most detailed geographic granularity offered by the CDC BRFSS SMART data used 
for health outcomes and health equity measures. All of these multiple linear regressions are all 
limited to the January – December 2016 timeframe.  
 
The first key outcome of interest from HVBP is to assess the extent to which the policy 
improved average health outcomes. This paper measures health outcomes using Healthy Days, a 
CDC-approved composite measure of the number of days per month that an individual reported 
feeling physically and mentally health7. Regression 1 is a preliminary characterization of various 
factors that potentially affect individual’s healthy days. In addition to analyzing demographic 
factors (race, sex), education level and socioeconomic factors (income, insurance status, 
employment status), the regression also attempts to understand whether hospitals’ patient 
communication scores are positively associated with healthy days. To do this, patient 
communication scores from HCAHPS data are averaged at the MMSA-level. The four domains 
of patient communication are: doctor-patient communication, nurse-patient communication, 
communication at discharge, and overall patient satisfaction. Table 2.1 shows the average scores 
 
7 For details on calculations of the Healthy Days measure, see the CDC’s guidelines here: 
https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/methods.htm  
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for these various components of the Person and Community Engagement dimension of the 
HVBP reimbursement methodology, which is calculated using HCAHPS scores. The table 
displays data for the 3,278 that are located in the 136 MMSAs included in the BRFSS dataset 
with MMSA-level geographic specificity (the Selected Metropolitan/Micropolitan Area Risk 
Trends, or SMART dataset). 
Table 2.1 HCAHPS Quality Scores  
(FY 2018: Performance Period Jan. - Dec. 2016) 
 Doctor-Patient Communication 79.53988 
  (4.17) 
 Nurse-Patient Communication 78.90652 
  (4.32) 
 Discharge Communication 86.72552 
  (3.28) 
 Overall Hospital Rating 70.73441 
  (7.41) 
   
 N (# of Hospitals) 3,278 
Source: Person and Community Engagement dimension scores (HCAHPS) from the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services. https://data.cms.gov/provider-data/dataset/avtz-f2ge   
 
It is expected that individuals living in MMSA’s with better average scores in each of 
these domains will experience better health, so the coefficient of this term is expected to be 
positive. However, it is unclear which of the four domains being tested will be most strongly 
predictive of individual health. Because MMSA’s often cross state boundaries, no state-level 
fixed effects are included. 𝑋! is a vector of individual characteristics including race, sex, 
educational attainment, income group and insurance status, and d. is a vector of MMSA-level 
characteristics including per capita income and population. 
(1) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦	𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠& = 	𝐵) + 𝐵#𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐴	𝐻𝐶𝐴𝐻𝑃𝑆	𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝑋&+	d* 	+ 	ℰ 
 Kadiyala 47 
Regression 2 is almost identical to Regression 1, except that the dependent variable is 
measure of health inequity. More correctly, the term “inequity” has a component of social 
justice, so the equation below shows a justice-neutral term, “disadvantage”.   
(2) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒! = 𝐵$ + 𝐵%𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐴	𝐻𝐶𝐴𝐻𝑃𝑆	𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝑋!+	d𝑚 	+ 	ℰ 
In this second regression, it is hypothesized that individuals living in MMSA’s with 
higher HCAHPS scores for communication and satisfaction will have better health outcomes 
and less health inequity on average. Although it is expected that respondents living in 
MMSA’s where the median income is greater are likely healthier, it is unclear whether 
disparities will also be lower. When using an equity measure, however, respondents living in 
MMSA’s where the median income is lower may experience greater inequity. 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of BRFSS SMART Respondents (2016) 
White (%) 74.6 
College Graduate (%) 40.52 
Income  <$15,000 (%) 7.1 
Income > $49,999 (%) 43.33 
Has Health Insurance (%) 92.62 
Healthy Days 23.50187 
  (10.327) 
Weighted Absolute Disparity 106.1125 
  (174.209) 
Weighted Relative Disparity 0.194 
  (.317) 
Weighted Relative Inequity 0.153 
  (.336) 
MMSA Population 2476947 
 (2919973) 
MMSA Per Capita Income 51600.74 
 (9452.081) 
  
N (individuals) 232,603 
N (MMSAs) 136 
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This paper also analyzes hospital-level community benefit spending regressions were 
conducted to understand associations between per-capita benefit spending, health outcomes, and 
health equity.  
Table 2.3 MMSA Average Per Capita Community Benefit Spending in 2016 (Thousands of 
$) 
Per Capita Total Community Benefits 0.139 
  (0.312) 
Per Capita Unreimbursed Medicaid 0.061 
  (0.181) 
Per Capita Community Health Improvement 0.004 
  (0.011) 
Per Capita Community Building Activities 0.001 
  (0.002) 
Per Capita Bad Debt 0.06 
  (0.126) 
MMSA Population 2476947.3  
(2919973) 
  
N (individuals) 177,829   
N (MMSAs) 136 
 
Mirroring regression 1, regression 3 elucidates associations between per capita hospital 
community benefit spending and healthy days. In other words, this regression seeks to unveil 
whether individuals living in MMSA’s where hospitals have invested more per capita in 
community benefit spending have greater healthy days on average. For this regression, the 
timeframe is once again limited to the year 2016. 𝑋! is a vector of individual characteristics 
including race, sex, educational attainment, income group and insurance status, and d. is a 
vector of MMSA-level characteristics including per capita income and population. 
(3) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦	𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠! =	𝐵$ + 𝐵%𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐴	𝑃𝑒𝑟	𝐶𝑎𝑝	𝐶𝐵	𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑋! + d. + 	ℰ 
(4) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒! =	𝐵$ + 𝐵%𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐴	𝑃𝑒𝑟	𝐶𝑎𝑝	𝐶𝐵	𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑋! 	+ d. + 	ℰ 
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Similar to regression 2, regression 4 examine the effect of average MMSA per-capita 




Individuals living in MMSA’s where hospitals performed better for nurse-patient 
communication and communication at discharge in 2016 have statistically significantly fewer 
healthy days per month, but the clinical significance is arguably negligible (Table 4.1). For 
example, a one-point increase in nurse-patient communication and communication upon 
discharge from the hospital correspond to a decrease of 0.02 healthy days per month (p<0.05; 
p<0.1, respectively). While causality cannot be determined, this may possibly be indicative of 
more challenging patient bases in certain areas that could have contributed to lower Healthy 
Days scores. Interestingly, MMSA’s with better patient communication and overall hospital 
ratings were mostly negatively correlated with both the absolute and relative measures of 
disparity, suggesting that promoting patient communication may indeed be a channel through 
with health disparities could be reduced (Table 4.2, Table 4.3). After adding controls, a one-point 
increase in average communication with doctors was correlated with a 0.34 unit decrease in 
weighted absolute disparity (p<0.05). Additionally, a one-point score increase in average 
communication at discharge was correlated with a 0.38 unit decrease in weighted absolute 
disparity (p<0.1). While HCAHPS scores were statistically significantly correlated with 
weighted relative disparity, the directionality was inconsistent, and the regression coefficients 
rounded to 0. Better nurse communication was once again associated with greater weighted 
relative disparity (p<0.01), while better doctor communication, discharge communication, and 
overall score, were associated with lower weighted relative disparity (p<0.05, p<0.1, p<0.01 
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respectively). The one measure of inequity (weighted relative inequity) used in this study showed 
no significant associations with any of the HCAHPS scores. This lack of significant associations 
between MMSA-level HCAHPS scores and health inequity suggest that more targeted efforts 
may be needed to reduce inequity, which is more rooted in social justice frameworks than 
disparity is (Table 4.4). 
Additionally, multiple linear regressions using 2016 data showed that individuals living 
in MMSA’s with greater average per capita community benefit spending did indeed experience 
more Healthy Days and smaller health gaps by all measures, suggesting that incentivizing 
community benefit spending may be a policy level that can be used to both improve aggregate 
health outcomes and reduce health disparities (Table 5.1). Total community benefit spending 
encompasses a variety of expenditures, from unreimbursed Medicaid to community health 
improvement activity. After adding controls, a $1,000 increase in per capita total community 
benefit spending was associated with an average increase in 0.6 Healthy Days (p<0.01), an 11.7 
point decrease in weighted absolute disparity (p<0.01), a 0.03 unit decrease in weighted relative 
disparity (p<0.01), and 0.02 unit decrease weighted relative inequity (p<0.01). Unreimbursed 
Medicaid, which is the amount that hospitals spend covering the cost of care that is not fully paid 
by Medicaid reimbursements, also saw similar but more pronounced trends. With controls, a 
$1,000 increase in per capita unreimbursed Medicaid spending in a particular MMSA was 
associated with an addition of 1.1 Healthy Days, an 18.6 unit decrease in weighted absolute 
disparity, a 0.05 unit decrease in weighted relative disparity, and a 0.04 unit decrease in weighted 
relative inequity (all p<0.01) (Table 5.2). Community building activities, a subcategory of total 
community benefit spending that refers specifically to activities that help address “upstream” 
factors and social determinants that impact health such as education, air quality, and access to 
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nutritious food had the greatest return on Healthy Days, and health disparity and inequity 
reduction. Every $100 increase in per capita community building activities spending was 
associated with a 4.3 day increase in Healthy Days, a 62.6 unit decrease in weighted absolute 
disparity, a 0.16 unit decrease in weighted relative disparity, and a 0.13 unit decrease in health 
inequity (p<0.01 for all four outcomes) (Table 5.3). Community Health Improvement spending 
followed similar trends. A $1000 increase in per capita CHI spending was associated with 16.19 
more healthy days, a 264 unit decrease in WAD, 0.71 unit decrease in WRD, ad 0.51 unit 
decrease in WRI (all p<0.01) (Table 5.4). Finally, Bad Debt, which consists of services for which 
a tax-exempt hospital anticipated payment from either an individual or an insurer but did not 
receive, also saw similar trends. Every $1,000 increase in per capita bad debt was associated with 
a 0.9 day increase in Healthy Days, a 23.6 unit decrease in weighted absolute disparity, a 0.07 
unit decrease in weighted relative disparity, and a 0.04 unit decrease in weighted relative 
inequity (p<0.01 for all) (Table 5.5). The significant positive associations healthy days and the 
significant negative associations with all measures of health disparity suggest that community 
benefit spending may potentially be a channel through which hospitals can address health 
disparities. Consequently, later difference-in-differences models sought to understand whether 
HVBP actually spurred hospitals to increase their community benefit spending or to change their 
benefit spending patterns in order to improve health outcomes and close health gaps. 
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Regression Tables 
Table 4.1 MMSA-Average HCAHPS Achievement Scores and Healthy Days 
Avg. Nurse 
Communication Score -0.06*** -0.024**       
 (0.01) (0.00)       
Avg. Doctor 
Communication Score   -0.00 0.01     
   (0.01) (0.01)     
Avg. Discharge 
Comm.     -0.03*** -0.02*   
     (0.01) (0.01)   
Avg. Overall Score       -0.01** -0.00 
       (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 27.98*** 19.55*** 23.80*** 17.11*** 26.35*** 19.57*** 24.22*** 17.67*** 
 (0.704) (0.799) (0.718) (0.769) (0.910) (1.084) (0.361) (0.444) 
         
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 
R-squared 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.065 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: race, sex, age group, income group, health 
insurance status, MMSA per capita income, MMSA population 
 
 




Score 0.94*** 0.25       
 (0.15) (0.17)       
Avg. Doctor 
Communication 
Score   -0.14 -0.34**     
   (0.15) (0.16)     
Avg. Discharge 
Comm. Score     0.10 -0.38*   
     (0.18) (0.21)   
Avg. Overall Score       0.20** -0.07 
       (0.09) (0.09) 
         
Constant 32.67*** 169.4*** 117.3*** 216.4*** 97.09*** 222.9*** 92.18*** 195.3*** 
 (11.88) (13.53) (12.11) (13.02) (15.36) (18.37) (6.096) (7.520) 
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 
R-squared 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.057 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: race, sex, age group, income group, health 
insurance status, MMSA per capita income, MMSA population 
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Table 4.2 MMSA-Average HCAHPS Achievement Scores and Weighted Relative Disparity 
(WRD) 
Avg. Nurse Communication Score 0.00265*** 0.00103***       
 (0.000276) (0.000300)       
Avg. Doctor Communication Score   4.86e-05 -0.000575**     
   (0.000279) (0.000290)     
Avg. Discharge Comm. Score     0.000688** -0.000666*   
     (0.000322) (0.000378)   
Avg. Overall Score       0.000532*** -0.000429*** 
       (0.000157) (0.000164) 
         
Constant -0.0142 0.300*** 0.190*** 0.428*** 0.134*** 0.441*** 0.156*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0246) (0.0221) (0.0237) (0.0280) (0.0334) (0.0111) (0.0137) 
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 232,603 230,205 
R-squared 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.061 
  
 
Table 4.3 MMSA-Average HCAHPS Achievement Scores and Weighted Relative Inequity 
(WRI) 
Avg. Nurse 
Communication Score 0.00201***    0.000590*    
 (0.000292)    (0.000318)    
Avg. Doctor 
Communication Score  0.000147    -0.000324   
  (0.000296)    (0.000307)   
Avg. Discharge 
Comm. Score   0.000607*    -0.000419  
   (0.000342)    (0.000401)  
Avg. Overall Score    0.000457***    -7.38e-05 
    (0.000166)    (0.000174) 
Constant -0.00373 0.142*** 0.101*** 0.122*** 0.282*** 0.355*** 0.365*** 0.334*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0234) (0.0297) (0.0118) (0.0261) (0.0251) (0.0354) (0.0145) 
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 232,603 232,603 232,603 232,603 230,205 230,205 230,205 230,205 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 
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Table 5.1 MMSA Average Per Capita Total Community Benefit Spending (Thousands of 





Days WAD WAD WRD WRD WRI WRI 
Per Capita Total 
Community Benefits 
(Thousands of $) 0.48*** 0.62*** -9.15*** -11.7*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (1.77) (1.79) (0.003) (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) 
         
Constant 23.37*** 16.40*** 108.8*** 209.9*** 0.201*** 0.443*** 0.159*** 0.368*** 
 (0.03) (0.24) (0.48) (4.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 
R-squared 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.064 
 
 
Table 5.2 MMSA Average Per Capita Unreimbursed Medicaid (Thousands of $), health 






Days WAD WAD WRD WRD WRI WRI 
Per Capita 
Unreimbursed 
Medicaid 0.93*** 1.14*** -15.41*** -18.60*** -0.037*** -0.047*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
 (0.20) (0.201) (3.39) (3.38) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Constant 23.38*** 16.51*** 108.5*** 207.6*** 0.200*** 0.437*** 0.158*** 0.364*** 
 (0.03) (0.23) (0.46) (4.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 
R-squared 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.064 
 
 
Table 5.3 MMSA Average Per Capita Community Building Activities Spending 





Days WAD WAD WRD WRD WRI WRI 
Per Capita 
Community 
Building Activities -0.456 43.94*** 171.1 -626.5*** 0.317 -1.62*** 0.311 -1.27*** 
 (12.29) (12.02) (205.9) (202.4) (0.378) (0.371) (0.401) (0.393) 
         
Constant 23.44*** 16.50*** 107.4*** 207.6*** 0.198*** 0.437*** 0.157*** 0.364*** 
 (0.0256) (0.240) (0.430) (4.035) (0.000788) (0.00739) (0.000837) (0.00784) 
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 
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R-squared 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.064 
 
Table 5.4 MMSA Average Per Capita Community Health Improvement Services 






Days WAD WAD WRD WRD WRI WRI 
Per Capita CHI 
Activities 10.38*** 16.19*** -173.1*** -264.0*** -0.42*** -0.71*** -0.31** -0.51*** 
 (3.956) (3.929) (66.30) (66.16) (0.122) (0.121) (0.129) (0.128) 
         
Constant 23.40*** 16.49*** 108.2*** 207.9*** 0.200*** 0.438*** 0.158*** 0.365*** 
 (0.0292) (0.240) (0.489) (4.034) (0.000898) (0.00738) (0.000953) (0.00783) 
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 
R-squared 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.064 
 
 






Days WAD WAD WRD WRD WRI WRI 
Per Capita 
Bad Debt 0.388* 0.990*** -11.37*** -23.59*** -0.02*** -0.07*** -0.02** -0.04*** 
 (0.21) (0.22) (3.62) (3.79) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Constant 23.41*** 16.28*** 108.2*** 213.8*** 0.19*** 0.45*** 0.16*** 0.37*** 
 (0.02) (0.24) (0.46) (4.19) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
All Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 177,307 
R-squared 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.064 
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